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NOTES
INTERNAL TRANSFERS OF CONTROL
UNDER POISON PILL PREFERRED
ISSUANCES TO SHAREHOLDERS:
TOWARD A SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL
RULE
The rise in number of tender offers1 for control of publiclyheld corporations2 has engendered widespread debate over the
proper role of corporate management in takeover struggles.3 The

'

See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developing Meaning]. Tender offers typically occur when an acquirer publicly offers shareholders of
a targeted company a price, above market value, at which they may tender their shares. Id.;
see also 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 106 (1978) (tender offer
defined). Tender offers provide a means of "determining when and under what terms...
corporate assets [will] be sold." Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A
Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 266 (1984). Partial and two-tier tender
offers facilitate the change in control of a corporation. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698, 727 (1982). In a partial tender offer, the acquirer
offers to purchase a controlling interest in a corporation, but less than all of its shares. See
Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison
Pill" Preferred,97 HARv. L. REV. 1964, 1965 n.9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Protecting
Shareholders]. A two-tier tender offer consists of an offer to buy a set number of shares at a
premium price, followed by an offer to buy the remaining shares at a lower price than was
paid in the first tier. See id. at 1965 n.10. Tender offers are frequently executed without the
approval of the target company's board of directors. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal
of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650 (1984).
2 See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 649-50, 652-53; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at
257. The number of significant tender offers increased from eight in 1960 to more than 100
in 1966. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 650 n.3. In the 1982 fiscal year there were
94 tender offers. Id. Tender offers have gained popularity because stock values have not
kept pace with inflation and the corresponding rise in the underlying value of many corporations' assets. See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 258. Additionally, banks today are more willing to provide financing to acquirers of corporations. See Toy, The Raiders, Bus. WK., Mar.
4, 1985, at 80-84. For a discussion of characteristics that make corporations attractive as
targets, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-9 (1973).
1 See ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANSMITrED TO THE CONGRESS, TOGETHER
WITH THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIc ADVIsoRs 206 (Feb. 1985) [hereinaf-
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debate frequently concerns the propriety of tender offers in general4 and the legality of defensive devices used by corporate manter cited as ECONOMIC REPORT]; Sommer, Hostile Tender Offer is CriticalIssue for Congress, 7 LEGAL TIMES 19 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Sommer, CriticalIssue]; see also Note,
The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARv. L. REV.

1894, 1908-10 (1983) (courts differ on standard of review in defense-of-control situations).
At one time, target management had an advantage in protecting itself against tender
offers, because under state regulations, management had enough time to fight off unwanted
offerors. See Sommer, CriticalIssue, supra, at 19-23. However, under the applicable federal
law today, tender offers proceed more quickly and management has less time to respond to
them. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639, 645-46 (1982); Greene & Junewicz, supra
note 1, at 653; A.A. SoMmER, J., Hostile Tender Offers: Time for a Review of Fundamentals, in TENDER OFFERs 253-56 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).
4 See Sommer, CriticalIssue, supra note 3, at 19, col. 1. Critics argue that tender offers

place undue emphasis on short term earnings and result in a decline in competitiveness.
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to ProfessorsEasterbrook
and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1231, 1233 (1980) (quoting E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE POWER 100-01 (1981)); Toy, supra note 2, at 82; Drucker, Taming the Corporate

Takeovers, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at 30, col. 3. But see Advisory Committee on Tender
Offers, Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Recommendations xvii (1983) (littie evidence that management emphasizes short term results at expense of long-term
growth) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Report]; Toy, supra note 2, at 83 (European companies are overprotected and complacent since takeovers are infrequent in Europe). It has also been suggested that takeovers are often motivated by greenmail, the practice of purchasing a bidder's stock holdings at a premium to prevent a takeover by that
bidder. See Norris, Enough Greenmail, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985, at E21, col. 1; see also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.3 (Del. 1985) (court upheld selective stock repurchase to defeat greenmaller). Additionally, critics contend that the expansion of debt in the economy, a result of takeover activity, will magnify business cycles and
could cause bankruptcies. See Sommer, CriticalIssue, supra note 3, at 19, col. 2; Toy, supra
note 2, at 82. Finally, critics argue that dislocations in the economy also result from takeover activity. See Sommer, CriticalIssue, supra note 3, at 19, col. 2; Saul, Hostile Takeovers: What Should Be Done?, 5 HARv. Bus. REv. 22 (1985).
Commentators in favor of tender offers argue that they create efficiency in the marketplace by making management more accountable. See Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations:The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 841,
843-44 (1981); Toy, supra note 2, at 82, 89-90; Icahn, Stop the Oppressionof Shareholders,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, at 2F, col. 2. These proponents maintain that shareholders are
among the ultimate beneficiaries of tender offers. See Gilson, supra, at 841-42; Toy, supra
note 2, at 80. But see Sommer, Critical Issue, supra note 3, at 24-25 (dispelling "myths"
that takeovers benefit shareholders and society).
The SEC Advisory Committee found insufficient evidence to support the statement
that "takeovers are per se beneficial or detrimental" to the economy, corporations, or shareholders. See Advisory Committee Report, supra,at xvii. The Committee suggested that federal regulations favor neither the acquirer nor the acquiring company. See id. at 15. Currently, federal regulations are oriented toward full disclosure and consumer protection and
away from promoting or discouraging tender offers. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458, 2463 (1985); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982); L. ARANOW
& H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 67-68. See generally Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at
654-55 & n.38 (summary of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provisions relating to
disclosure).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:94

agers to thwart such takeovers. 5 Generally, courts have upheld
management actions under the business judgment rule6 based on
5 See Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses
Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 977, 977-80 (1983); Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51, 51
(1982). Many commentators suggest that shareholders should have a greater role in determining the propriety of defenses to tender offers. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 4, at 876;
Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 731; Harrington, supra, at 1024-25. Greater shareholder
participation in such decisions would alleviate the concern that shareholders may be hurt by
takeover defenses that deprive them of the ability to tender their shares at a profit or depress the value of their shares if the offer fails. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at
702-03.
Defensive strategies range from the sale of a corporation's valuable property or "crown
jewel," e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981) (sale of
valuable mineral rights), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn,
537 F. Supp. 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (sale of assets at price below market value), to the
"Pac Man defense," a counter tender offer by the target company, e.g., Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 625 (D. Md. 1982) (target company made offer to
buy acquiring company's stock); see Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 249-50. A target corporation may also issue shares to a friendly third party, see, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1980)(issuance of shares upheld under business judgment
rule); see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 247-49, to employees, see, e.g., Pogostin
v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984)(stock option plan upheld), or to an employee stock
option ownership plan (ESOP), see 1 A. FLEISCHER,

TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING 95-101 (rev. perm. ed. 1984). See generally E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra

note 2, at 234-76 (overview of substantive defense tactics); E. ARANOw, H. EINHORN, & G.
193-202 (1977) (examination of defensive tactics) [hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS]. For a practitioner's
guide to defensive strategies, see P. DAvEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER
OFFERS 6-25 (1977); 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra, at 291-387; M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 1, at §§ 1.9, 6.1-6.6.
6 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.) (courts will not
interfere with business judgment of corporate directors), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982);
Gimbel v. Signal Co., 316 A.2d 599, 609-15 (Del. Ch.) (business judgment rule favors director's decision unless shareholder can prove fraud or inadequate sale price), aff'd, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974); Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 653 (courts unreceptive to challenges
to business judgment rule). See generally Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly
City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REv. 597, 614 n.50 (1982) (variations on business
judgment rule).
Commentators often divide the obligations owed by corporate managers into a duty of
care and a duty of loyalty. See, e.g., CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591,
1599-1604 (1978); Harrington, supra note 5, at 987-90. The duty of care involves application
of the standard of reasonableness, see CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra, at 1601, while
the duty of loyalty involves the standard of good faith, see Harrington, supra note 5, at 989;
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 93, 115-18 (1979). Under
the business judgment rule, if the plaintiff proves that a director's actions arose from bad
faith or a conflict of interest, the burden shifts to management to demonstrate the fairness
and reasonableness of the transaction. See Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382
(2d Cir. 1980); 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 194-95; see also Note, ProtectingShareholders, supra note 1, at 1969 (initial burden of proving director's bad faith always on plaintiff).
The director or officer will usually try to show that the board's action was motivated primarBERLSKEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
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an unwillingness to substitute the courts' judgment for that of cor-

porate directors presumed to be acting in the best interests of the
corporations. 7 Defensive devices adopted in anticipation of hostile
tender offers have also gained a significant degree of acceptance in
the courts." Such devices frequently involve an amendment to the
corporate charter or bylaws.9
ily by a proper business purpose. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 499, 199 A.2d 548,
554-55 (1964); Note, ProtectingShareholders, supra note 1, at 1969. Commentators criticize
the business judgment rule because it can easily be circumvented by directors "advised by
knowledgeable coumqel." Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control:An Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management Defensive Measures,66 IowA L. REv. 475, 499500 (1981); see Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 314; Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 926 (1979).
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Greene & Junewicz,
supra note 1, at 711-12. Courts try to avoid giving directors the "Hobson's choice... between accepting any tender offer ...
above market, or facing the likelihood of personal
liability if they reject it." Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
' See, e.g., Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977) (scaled
voting); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 2, 4 (Del. Ch. 1983)
(preferred stock issuance to shareholders gave them 80% supermajority and redemption
privilege); Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 380 Mass. 656, 660, 405 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1980)
(75% supermajority). Pre-tender offer defensive strategies include the use of lock-ups, issuing of stock into friendly hands, defensive acquisitions, and stock repurchases. See Coffee,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLU. L. Rav. 1145, 1147-48 & n.3 (1984); Harrington,
supra note 5, at 984-85. See generally 1 A. FLmscHER, supra note 5, at 3-144 (pre-tender
offer strategies discussed).
9 See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: StructuralLimitations
on the Enabling Concept, 34 STA. L. Rav. 775, 777 (1982); Harrington, supra note 5, at
984-85 & n.37; Comment, Corporate Takeover Battles-Shark Repellant Charter and Bylaw Provisionsthat Deter Hostile Tender Offers or Other Acquisitions-A Comprehensive
Examination, 27 How. L.J. 1683, 1689-90 (1984). Defensive antitakeover amendments, also
known as shark repellent amendments, render a corporation less desirable to potential acquirers by making it difficult for them to achieve control in a takeover attempt. See Black &
Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 699, 699-700 (1979); Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 703. State
statutes usually require shareholder approval of shark repellent amendments. Id.;
Friedenberg, Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments as a Takeover
Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32, 48 (1982); Gilson, supra, at 779. For a list of sources concerning antitakeover shark repellent amendments, see Gilson, supra, at 777 n.6.
Professor Gilson places shark repellent amendments into three categories. See id. at
780. The first category "imped[es] transfer[s] of control of the board of directors." Id. For
example, staggering the board or limiting the ability of shareholders to call special meetings
or act by written consent may cause an undesirable delay in the transfer of control. Id. at
781-82; see Friedenberg, supra, at 41-42. The second category erects "barriers to secondstep transactions." Gilson, supra, at 783. Supermajority provisions that require anywhere
from a two-thirds to 95% shareholder vote to approve second-step transactions such as
mergers or tender offers fall within this category. Id. The provisions normally contain an
exception to the supermajority requirement; however, that exception operates in the event
that continuing directors negotiate a friendly takeover. Id. at 785. The third category con-
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Recently, several courts have approved the issuance of "poison
pill" preferred rights to shareholders of potential target corporations prior to the announcement of any tender offers for the corporations.10 The rights in these cases were designed to be triggered in
the event of a change in control." When exercised, they would either cause massive dilution of the stock of the acquiring corporation or would otherwise make the acquisition extremely expensive. 12 Additionally, upon issuance of the poison pills, the
respective boards of directors received greatly increased power to
negotiate with bidders for corporate control.' 3 Nevertheless, the
cerns "[flair price and compulsory redemption provisions." Id. at 786. These provisions focus on the rights of minority shareholders subsequent to a tender offer and ensure that
minority shareholders are treated fairly in a second-step transaction by guaranteeing that
their shares will be purchased at a price that equals or exceeds the price paid in the tender
offer. See id. at 787-88; Friedenberg, supra, at 44-45; see also Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense Charter Provisions,4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 1227 (1978) (practical considerations of implementing fair price provision and redemption
rights provision).
10 E.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985) ("poison pill"
issued by directors upheld by Delaware Supreme Court); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Nev. 1985) (injunction preventing directors' action on
stock purchase rights plan denied); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc.,
501 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Del. Ch.) (prospective rights plan held initially valid), aff'd, [current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985). Poison pill issuances to shareholders may be
designed to create redemption privileges allowing nontendering shareholders to compel the
acquirer to purchase their shares for a designated price or for no less than that paid by
tendering shareholders. See Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and
Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 300-01 (1984). Poison pills may also be
structured to enable shareholders to convert their shares into stock of the acquiring entity.
See generally Lewin, Tactic That's 'Poison' to Bids, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at D1, col. 3
(list of corporations that have issued various poison pills); Fleischer & Golden, PoisonPill,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 26, col. 1 (variations in poison pill plans). In the Household case,
Household International's poison pill fell into this category because a would-be acquirer
would have to swallow the rights in the event of a freeze-out merger. See Household, 500
A.2d at 1349; Ferrara & Phillips, Oppositionto 'PoisonPill' Warrants is Mounting, 7 LEGAL
TIMES

13 (1984).

1 See, e.g., Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (D. Nev. 1985)
(rights activated by tender offer for 30% or acquisition of 20% of shares by entity); Moran
v. Household, Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del. 1985) (same); MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1251 (Del. Ch.) (rights triggered when any
person acquires 20% of stock), aff'd, [current] FED. SEC. L. RaP. 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985);
Note, ProtectingShareholders,supra note 1, at 1964-65.
12 See, e.g., Household, 500 A.2d at 1349 (holders of 1/100 of a share of preferred stock
able to purchase $200 worth of acquirer's stock for $100); Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243 (triggering event plus tender offer for less than $65 allows, holder to exchange one share common
stock for $65); Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 2-3.
" See, e.g., Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1244.
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courts held that the boards were not required to secure shareholder approval before issuing the rights,14 on the theory that
"blank-check" preferred statutes in the particular states obviate
the need for shareholder approval. 15 These blank-check statutes
authorize boards to issue various types of preferred stock at their
own discretion.16
It is submitted that the issuance of poison pill rights accomplishes an internal transfer of control of the corporation from
shareholders to the directors. Therefore, it is suggested that shareholder approval should be required in such instances. This Note
will examine the shift in control upon the issuance of a poison pill
and will suggest that a rule requiring shareholder approval should
apply when rights are issued either before or after a tender offer is
announced.
THE TREND TO UPHOLD THE Household VARmTY OF RIGHTS PLANS

The lead case on the legality of poison pill preferred rights is
Moran v. Household International." Perceiving a vulnerability to
hostile takeover attempts, the board of directors of Household International created a poison pill' designed to render a partial or
two-tier hostile tender offer for the company virtually impossible.1 9
The poison pill or "rights plan" implemented by the board consisted of the issuance of warrants, or "rights," as a dividend, which
would trade with common stock and would not be independently
" See Household, 500 A.2d at 1348; Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1251.
"5 See, e.g., Household, 500 A.2d at 1348; National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co.,
No. 7278, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983); see Note, ProtectingShareholders,supra
note 1, at 1937.
18 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 502 (McKinney
1963); 1 MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 6.02 (3d ed. 1985); see 11 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5284.1 (perm. ed. 1971); Finkelstein,
supra note 10, at 299. See generally Note, Protecting Shareholders,supra note 1, at 197375 (board power to issue blank-check stock should be expansive).
17 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); see Horwitz, 604 F. Supp. at 1136; Hertzberg, Delaware
Court Upholds the Use of 'PoisonPills,' Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Household, there were few cases
concerning poison pills. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th
Cir. 1984); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 25,
1983).
's See Household, 500 A.2d at 1349.
19 See id. at 1352; Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 1. In a letter to its
shareholders, Household stated that the plan would "deter any attempts to acquire your
company in a manner or on terms not approved by the Board." Ferrara & Phillips, supra
note 10, at 13, col. 1.
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transferable.20 The rights would separate from the common stock
and become exercisable if "triggered" by a twenty percent accumulation of Household's common stock or by an offer to purchase
thirty percent of the stock.21 Once the rights were triggered,
Household shareholders would be entitled to purchase non-redeemable preferred stock at an initially uneconomical price of onehundred dollars per one one-hundredth of a share. 2 However, the
rights would be redeemable by Household for fifty cents per right
at any time prior to a twenty percent triggering event.23 In the
event of a business combination with Household, the holder of a
right would be entitled to purchase two-hundred dollars worth of
the common stock of the surviving company for one-hundred dollars, the exercise price of the right.24 This "flipover," if it occurred,
would result in severe dilution of the acquirer's stock. 25
Attacked by a group of potential bidders, the plan was upheld
in the Delaware Supreme Court. The court placed on the plaintiffs
the burden of proving that the board either acted in bad faith or
for purposes of entrenchment.28 Household's board had the burden
of showing that the action was reasonable in relation to the perceived threat of two-tier tender offers. The court dismissed the
plaintiff's contention that issuance of the rights caused an unlawful
transfer of power from the shareholders to the board by reasoning
20 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), af'd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985); Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 1.
2' See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). The rights would
be "triggered" even if an acquirer merely achieved the right to purchase or vote 20% of
Household's common stock or "announce[d] formation of a group of persons holding 20% to
act together." Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985). The group proviso prevents persons acting in concert from taking control
while individually remaining below the 20% threshhold. See id. at 1080.
22

See Household, 500 A.2d at 1349.

See id. at 1349. The triggering devices of the plan encourage negotiation with the
board. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985). The board could redeem the rights if an acquirer with whom the board
chose to deal were to announce an offer to purchase 30% of Household stock. See Note,
Protecting Shareholders,supra note 1, at 1965. The board could also refuse to redeem in
any event. Id. Should the acquirer choose to proceed with a business combination, it would
be forced to swallow the poison pill. Id.
2 See Household, 500 A.2d at 1349.
13

25

See id.

26 See id. at 1356-57.
17 See id. at 1356. The Household court determined that the rights plan was a reasonable defensive mechanism to protect the company against coercive acquisition techniques.
See id.
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that successful hostile tender offers could still be launched. 2
A rights plan similar to Household's was at issue before the
District Court of Nevada in Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. 29 Southwest Forest's board had issued rights which, in

the event of a merger, would entitle the holder of a right to
purchase one-hundred dollars worth of the acquirer's stock for fifty
dollars.3 0 The court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, holding that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate
probable success on the merits since he would likely be unable to
show bad faith, self-dealing or an abuse of discretion by the
board.3 ' The court believed that management's actions were sound
under the business judgment rule and that the rights plan was
32
probably legal.

In MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, v. Revlon, Inc.,33 a
rights plan issued by Revlon, Inc., designed to strengthen the
board's bargaining position, was held valid absent other considera28 See id. at 1354. The Household court distinguished between governance structure
and value structure. See id. The court reasoned that there was little change in the governance structure of the corporation since "[t]he [b]oard has no more discretion in refusing to
redeem [r]ights than it [has] in enacting any defensive mechanism." Id. The court also concluded that Household's rights plan caused less harm to the value structure of the corporation than other defensive devices that increase the debt of a corporation. See id. The court
dismissed plaintiff's contention that the rights plan constituted a sham by observing that
the rights can and will be exercised. See id. at 1352.
11 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985).
-1 See id. at 1132. Like Household International, Southwest Forest could redeem its
rights for a nominal amount before certain triggering events occurred. See id.; supra note 23
and accompanying text.
2 See Horwitz, 604 F. Supp. at 1136. The Horwitz court noted that the trend in other
jurisdictions indicated that Southwest Forest's conduct was "probably legal in the absence
of improper motive or intent." Id. As a practical matter, the court feared that to remove the
rights from the New York Stock Exchange and from Southwest Forest stock certificates
would confuse the company's management as well as investors. See id. at 1135-36. Therefore, the balance of the equities in this proceeding for a preliminary injunction weighed in
favor of Southwest Forest, according to the court. Id.
32 See id. at 1136. The court recognized that a board may be justified in building up a
company from within, rather than through takeovers. See id. at 1135; Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). Judge Reed
stated "[i]t is not the consensus of the courts and commentators that the promotion of
active competition among would-be acquirers of a corporation is the sole aim of corporate
law." Horwitz, 604 F. Supp. at 1135 (citing Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Northwest,
741 F.2d 1555, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1984)). But see MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc. v.
Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250-51 (Del. Ch.) (defensive lock-up that ended bidding for
target illegal), afl'd, [current] FED. SEc. L. RE'. 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985); Note, Lock-up
Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 1068, 1077-81 (1983) (courts
should encourage competitive bidding).
3 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985).
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tions 3 4 The issuance of the rights, however, was determined to be
invalid because the Revlon board breached its fiduciary duties to
shareholders when it implemented a lock-up agreement that effectively terminated further bidding for the corporation in an active
bidding market.3 5
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST

Courts frequently have inquired into a board of directors'
motivations to determine the validity of a defensive issuance of
stock. 6 If the primary purpose of a board's action is to maintain
control of the corporation, the action will not be sustained, despite
the deference afforded the board under the business judgment
rule.3 7 The burden of proving that the board acted with an improper purpose generally lies with the plaintiff.3 8 In certain in" See id. at 1247. The Revlon court determined that directors have a duty to defend
their corporation against a takeover attempt that they believe is adverse to the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. See id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). Revlon's rights plan involved the issuance of a right, which when
triggered allowed all holders except the hostile bidder to exchange one share of common
stock for $65 in notes. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243. The rights were triggered when a
person acquired 20% of the company unless the person promptly purchased all of the company's remaining shares for at least $65 each. Id. The board could redeem the rights for a
nominal amount prior to the triggering event. Id. at 1243-44.
11 See 501 A.2d at 1247-48. The court burdened the board with proving the rationality
of actions taken in connection with the lock-up agreement. See id. at 1250. Because the
lock-up agreement terminated bidding for Revlon in an active market and relieved the directors of certain damaging consequences of the defensive devices that they had adopted,
the court determined that the directors had failed to demonstrate the rationality of their
actions and thus were not protected by the business judgment rule. See id.
"eSee, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (stock issuance to directors and officers not invalid if proper corporate goal is principal purpose); Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 359, 230 A.2d 769, 775 (1967) (stock issuance to third
party must not be for improper purpose); A. FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 184.
"7See, e.g., Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Del. Ch. 1941) (breach of duty for
directors to issue shares for improper purpose such as enabling person or group to take
voting control from shareholders); TENDER OFFERS, supra note 5, at 200. In Treadway Cos.
v. Care Corp., it was determined that the directors did not act improperly in issuing stock to
a white knight and were therefore protected under the business judgment rule. See 638 F.2d
357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Inc., 301 F. Supp. 706,
711-12 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (board was protected under business judgment rule when plaintiff
was unable to prove board's desire to remain in office was sole or primary motive). At least
one commentator has speculated that the "primary purpose test" lies somewhere between
the business judgment rule and fairness tests of state law. See Gutman, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 16 SEc. L. REv. 325, 357 n.162 (1984). For
an overview of the business judgment rule, see supra notes 6-7.
" See Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Inc., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 360, 230 A.2d 769, 776-77 (1967); Har-
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stances, however, the defendant directors are required to justify
their actions by showing that the board's decision to adopt a defensive mechanism was reasonable.39
Commentators have criticized the motivational or "primary
purpose test," suggesting that its application is impractical when a
board acts with mixed motives.40 It is submitted that in the area of
rights plans, the primary purpose test is even more problematic. In
Household, for example, the court required the board to show that
it had reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed.41 A showing that the board feared a
harmful takeover and sought to prevent coercive two-tier tender
offers was deemed sufficient to satisfy this burden.42 It is suggested
rington, supra note 5, at 1005. But see, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
266-67 (2d Cir. 1984) (management failed to show that stock issuance to ESOP was designed
to benefit employees, and not simply to entrench management). See generally A. FLEisnFR,
supra note 5, at 196 (courts sometimes inconsistent in allocating burden of proof under
primary purpose test).
39 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (initial
burden of coming forward on directors when adoption of defensive mechanism at issue);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (directors must show
reasonableness of their action in relation to threat posed); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548,
555 (Del. 1964) (directors must show they reasonably believed corporate policy and effectiveness in danger).
40 Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 66-67; see, e.g., Harrington, supra note 5, at 992-93;
Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 926-27; Gilson, supra note 4, at 829-31. One commentator has recommended that the traditional test-that directors' defensive actions were based
on a concern for corporate policy-be replaced by a test of "whether the defensive action is
reasonably calculated to benefit shareholders in a market sense, that is, higher values for
their securities." Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints- An Interest Analysis, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 613, 655 (1970).
41 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); see also MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Del. Ch.) (board burdened with demonstrating rationality of issuing rights), aff'd, [current] FED. SEc. L. REP. 1
32,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899, slip op. at 7 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 12, 1985) (board must demonstrate rational purpose of conduct that shifts internal
structure of corporation and transfers power from shareholders to management).
42 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985); see also MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1244 (Del. Ch.) (rights plan
merited protection of business judgment rule since it was designed to strengthen board's
bargaining position), aff'd, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. V 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985). The
question of whether partial and two-tier tender offers harm shareholders has been widely
debated. Compare Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 337 (1974) (two-tier offers coercive) with Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 1, at 727-28 (two-tier offers help all shareholders maximize value of shares). The
coercive aspects of two-tier and partial tender offers have placed the shareholder in a "prisoner's dilemma." See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 254, 307. Shareholders are unable to
bargain collectively for a higher price and feel compelled to tender at the relatively advantageous first tier of the tender offer. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
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that it is difficult to prove that the board acted to solidify management's control, not primarily as a means of protecting shareholders, but rather as an end in itself.43 In early defensive stock issuance cases, courts frequently tried to justify a finding that the
plaintiff failed to prove the board acted for an improper purpose
by asserting that shareholders received tangible consideration,"
such as a benefit to the corporation's employees,45 an increase in
the corporation's capital,4 6 or an opportunity for the corporation to
956 & n.12 (Del. 1985); Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 254, 309. In partial tender offers, shareholders may not wish to risk continued investment in the new entity and may feel compelled to abandon their investment. See Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 1, at
1966-67.
" See National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 25, 1983) (management entrenchment may constitute "inevitable byproduct" of preferred stock dividend); cf. Gilson, supra note 9, at 805 (shark repellents in general have both
purpose and unavoidable consequence of making management more secure). The plaintiff's
burden of proof is significant because the plaintiff does not have access to facts probative of
a defendant's motivation. See Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 271-72 (1966); Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 317 (1960).
44 See infra notes 45-47. Courts have struck down stock issuances when the corporation
or its shareholders received no consideration. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc.,
744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) ("no real consideration was received from the ESOP for the
shares"); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 360, 230 A.2d 769, 777 (1967)
(issuance of stock to subsidiary of white knight brought no funds into corporate treasury);
Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 13 Del. Ch. 120, 122, 115 A. 918, 921 (1922) (directors gave
nothing for voting stock to themselves). Some courts have considered a defendant's claim
that consideration was received and have rejected it as a pretext when the directors' primary purpose was to manipulate the corporation to entrench their control. See, e.g., Podesta
v. Calumet Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,433, at 93,552,
93,556 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (determination that employee, tax and financial benefits were pretext); Ward Foods, Inc. v. Lambert, 1 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 137, 143 (Del. 1972) (plan was
adopted to thwart threat to management notwithstanding claims by defendant that plan
was designed to improve job satisfaction and corporate competitiveness). A court will generally refrain from determining the adequacy of consideration when it has not sensed an improper purpose. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980)
(adequacy of consideration left to directors unless disproportionate); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d
1157, 1162 (1st Cir. 1977) ("assessment of the adequacy of consideration received for an
issue of stock" is responsibility of board); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984)
(only need "reasonable relationship" between value of options and value of benefits passing
to corporation).
45 See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (proper purposes for
issuing stock include promoting loyalty of key personnel and ensuring that they remain with
corporation); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 351 (D. Del. 1948) (issue proper since
options based on legal consideration); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 250, 17 A.2d 309,
312-13 (1941) (shares issued to employee for valuable consideration).
46 See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (issue of new shares to
officers and directors raised new capital for corporation); see Lynch v. Steinberg, supra note
6, at 936.
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enter into a beneficial business combination.47 In cases involving
Household-type rights plans, however, courts have concluded that
a board can act for a proper primary purpose despite the wholesale
absence of such independent justification.48
IMPOSITION OF A SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL REQUIREMENT

Under traditional corporate law theory, the general authority
of the board of directors extends to managing the business and affairs of a corporation. 49 The shareholders, not management, have

the authority to effect radical changes in the power structure of a
corporation." As corporations have grown in size and complexity,
however, board authority has expanded to include the formulation
of business policy, and a board's managerial function has been
characterized as the monitoring of key management executives.5 1
47 See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (board
was moving Treadway toward business combination with Fair Lanes); Northwest Indus.
Inc., v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 711 (N.D. IlM.1969) (officers and directors
determined that $35,000,000 acquisition of joint venture was in best interests of
corporation).
48 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (rights plan protects target corporation from coercive acquisition techniques); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell
& Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (preferred stock provides
protection from partial or two-tier tender offers).
4' See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a) (1983)); Glekel v. Gluck, 30 N.Y.2d 93, 97, 281 N.E.2d 171, 172, 330 N.Y.S.2d 371,
373 (1972) (applying N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1982)); 2 W. FLETCHER, supra
note 16, § 505, at 515; Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in
Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 87-89, 142-43 (1969) (citing 1 V.
MORAWETZ, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONs 447-48 (2d ed. 1886)).
80 See Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 334 (DeL Ch. 1979) (shareholders of
Delaware corporation have specific right to vote on fundamental corporate structure);
Hodge v. Cuba Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 340, 345, 60 A.2d 88, 93 (1948) (directors should seek
approval of shareholders to change substantially capital structure of company); Watson v.
Washington Preferred Life Ins. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 403, 406, 502 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1972) (en
banc) (each shareholder has right to continuation of corporate structure until altered by
proper action of shareholders); 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 16, § 7063, at 61; Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, Hnv. Bus. REV. Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 110-11 (shareholders hold
right to organizational control). See generally Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 86-91, 142-45
(delineates roles of shareholders and management).
51 See Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37
MIAMI L. REV. 187, 204-05 (1983); CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 6, at 1603.
The Model Business Corporation Act states that "[aill corporatepowers shall be exercised
by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under
the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of
incorporation." 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.01(b) (3d ed. 1985) (emphasis added).
The American Law Institute has suggested that corporate boards have the authority to "initiate and adopt major corporate plans, commitments, and actions [and] [a]ct as to all...
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While under state law board authority may extend even to the approval of mergers and the sale of substantially all assets, 52 it is submitted that the board should not have the authority to change unilaterally the structure of the corporation to prevent shareholders
from tendering their shares to persons who seek control of the corporation.5 3 It is submitted that a board of directors issuing a
Household-type poison pill effects such an unwarranted shift of
power.
Courts have held that a board that adopts a poison pill plan
effectively seizes the power to bargain in the event of a tender offer.5 4 In Household, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected this
corporate matters not requiring shareholder approval." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) § 3.02, at 67.
52 See, e.g., DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8,§§ 251, 271 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 902, 909
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984).
53 See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (mem.); Dumon v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 107 F.R.D. 761, 765 (N.D. IMI.1985) (court
not convinced that poison pill plan does not implicate "legitimate procedures to gain control"). A board's action may be impermissible, even though it is technically legal, when it
undermines principles of corporate governance. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984); Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 18, col. 2. In the Norlin
case, Judge Kaufman wrote that:
Our most important duty is to protect the fundamental structure of corporate
governance. While the day-to-day affairs of a company are to be managed by its
officers under the supervision of directors, decisions affecting a corporation's ultimate destiny are for the shareholders to make in accordance with democratic
procedures.
744 F.2d at 258. Commentators have suggested that allowing boards to assume a plenary
bargaining role could upset the statutory structural scheme that gives management the authority to veto mergers and sales of assets, but not tender offers. See Harrington, supra note
5, at 1003; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 266; Masters, 'Poison Pill' Takeover Defense Stirs
Controversy, Uncertainty,6 LEGAL TIMES 1, col. 2 (1983). But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 108-09 (1979) (board should have some authority
to respond to mergers as tender offers); Mullaney, GuardingAgainst Takeovers-Defensive
Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441, 1461 (1970) (same policies underlying board approval of mergers and tender offers support board veto power in event of both). Some courts
have endeavored to safeguard the privilege shareholders enjoy in determining the outcome
of tender offers. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 267 (2d Cir. 1984)
(court refused to permit "wholesale wresting of corporate power from the hands of the
shareholders, to whom it is entrusted by statute"); Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp.
1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (directors could not enjoin Seagram's tender offer and thereby
"deny [shareholders] their right to pass upon [the tender] offer"); Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 361, 230 A.2d 769, 777 (1967) (improper stock issuance
"strikes at the very heart of corporate representation"); see also E. ARANoW & H. EINHORN,
supra note 2, at 195 (defensive amendments to certificates "are contrary to the basic principles of corporate democracy").
" See, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1244
(Del. Ch.) (board assumed plenary negotiating authority by issuing rights plan), aff'd, [cur-
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conclusion by contending that a hostile takeover attempt for a
company that has adopted a rights plan could be successful, and
that therefore, in adopting a plan the board does not unilaterally
transfer corporate power to itself.5 5 However, as long as the board's
actions in considering hostile takeover attempts remain within the
substantial protection of the business judgment rule, the directors
have the exclusive power to accept or reject any tender offers. 6
Thus, it is submitted that by issuing a rights plan such as the one
approved in Household, a board of directors unilaterally changes
the structure of the corporation by transfering control from the
shareholders to itself.57 It is suggested that the potential for abuse
and the questionable authority of boards to issue Household-type
rights plans, point to a need for shareholder approval of such
plans.5 8
rent] FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes a Court,
611 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.N.J. 1985) (poison pill preferred calculated to alter structure of
corporation); see Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 3; Carney, Takeover Tussles;
The Courts' Tug-of-War With Corporate Boards, Bus. & SocIETY REV. 64, 66, 67 (1985);
Goldsmith, Hostile Takeovers Easier to Swallow Than Poison Pills, Wall St. J., Feb. 11,
1985, at 16, col. 3.
" See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353-54 (Del. 1985). In Household, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that in deciding whether to redeem the rights
upon a tender offer, Household's board will be held to the fiduciary standards applicable to
the adoption of defensive devices, and therefore the board will not be able to reject hostile
tender offers arbitrarily. See id. at 1354. The Delaware Supreme Court also pointed to the
takeover of Crown Zellerbach Corporation by Sir James Goldsmith despite Crown
Zellerbach's prior adoption of a rights plan. See id. However, it should be noted that the
shareholders did not have the opportunity to tender their shares for a premium in connection with Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach. See Stewart, Goldsmith's Move on
Crown ZellerbachPrompts 'PoisonPill' Potency Questions, Wall St. J., May 16, 1985, at 6,
col. 2; see also Dwyer, Dobrzynski, Who's Afraid of the Poison Pill?, Bus. WLn, Aug. 12,
1985, at 22, col. 3 (poison pill remains a substantial inhibition to takeovers despite Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach).
" See supra note 55; Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 3, & 17, col. 2; SEC
Seeks Antidote for Poison Pill, 1 SEC. REG. (P-H) 1 7.2 (Apr. 4, 1985).
Judicial deference to corporate boards under the business judgment rule undermines
the argument that hostile tender offers may be successfully executed once a corporation has
adopted a rights plan. See Note, Protecting Shareholders,supra note 1, at 1069 (directors
decisions seldom overturned under fiduciary duty claims); supra notes 40-48. But see, e.g.,
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1251 (Del. Ch.) (having issued poison pill, board failed in its fiduciary duty to shareholders when it ended bidding and negotiations involving any and all offer for cash), aff'd, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985).
" See Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes a Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.N.J. 1985). But
see Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (rights plan effects little
change in governance structure).
1 See supra notes 49-53; Coffee, supra note 8, at 1147-48 n.3. Some issuances of preferred stock or rights are less egregious than others. Compare Household, 490 A.2d at 1066
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Finally, shareholder approval frequently is required before a
board may implement a takeover device designed for use before a
tender offer has been announced. 59 Courts generally have upheld
antitakeover amendments when shareholders have validated
them.60 Rights plans such as Household's, have been analogized to
antitakeover amendments that require shareholder approval.6 1 It is
submitted that because these defensive antitakeover devices are
adopted for similar reasons, 2 poison pills should not be treated
differently from them, and therefore, adoption of a rights plan
should be subject to validation by the shareholders.6
(dilution of acquirer's stock is devastating) with Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243 (acquirer could
overcome rights plan by paying $65 per share for all shares); see also Note, Protecting
Shareholders,supra note 1, at 1967 (Bell & Howell issuance not a complete bar to certain
tender offers). The SEC argued that Household's poison pill constituted a more drastic measute than poison pill plans that act as fair price amendments because the latter only deter
bidders who seek to make a two-tier tender offer. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission at 7 & n.5, Amicus Curiae, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del.
Ch.) afl'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Block, Barton & Radin, Business Judgment Rule
Changes, N.Y.L.J. May 28, 1985, at 31, col. 3 n.50.
:9 See Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 34-48; A. FLEiSCHER, supra note 5, at 12.
e0 See, e.g., Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979) (reported
in 5 DiL. J. CoRP. L. 514, 518 (1980)) (shareholders empowered to enact charter containing
supermajority), aff'd, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980); Stockholders Comm. for Better Management
of Erie Technological Prods., Inc. v. Erie Technological Prods., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 380, 389
(W.D. Pa. 1965) (board's purposes in adopting staggered board immaterial when it obtained
shareholder approval); see also A. FLEiscHER, supra note 5, at 12 (most structural changes
such as shark repellants require shareholder approval). But see National Educ. Corp. v. Bell
& Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25 1983) (defensive issuance of preferred stock upheld); Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977)
(board-instituted scaled voting upheld). Some commentators have suggested that antitakeover amendments affecting the structure of the corporation should require shareholder approval. See Green & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 731; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 255.
Others, however, have argued that shareholder approval may not reflect a shareholder's actual interests since sophisticated shareholders may not be able or willing to sway the votes
of other investors. See Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 78; Gilson, supra note 9, at 825. But
see Harrington, supra note 5, at 1025-26 (shareholder vote is not an empty formality).
6' See Bialkin, Some Strategies to Avoid Unfriendly Acquisitions, N.Y.L.J., May 28,
1985, at 25, col. 2, & 36, col. 3. The justifications for enacting antitakeover amendments are
similar to those that the Delaware court used in validating Household's rights plan: protection of the corporation and its shareholders from coercive acquisition techniques. See, e.g.,
Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 34 (shark repellants protect minority shareholders in event of
successful tender offers); Finkelstein, supra note 10, at 295-96 (fair price, mandatory bid,
and flip-over provisions protect all shareholders).
:2 See supra note 61.
63 It is submitted that had the Household rights plan been placed before the shareholders, its approval would have been unlikely since the Household board initially feared that a
fair price amendment would not pass. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059,
1064 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Generally, management has had increasing
difficulty in getting shareholders, particularly institutional investors, to approve various an-
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APPLICATION OF THE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL
RULE IN LIGHT OF RECENT DECISIONS

Several courts recently have enjoined a variety of poison pill
preferred plans created to defend against an existing tender offer,
basing their decisions primarily on statutory grounds.6 4 It is suggested that by reasoning that an internal transfer of control would
occur, these courts could have enjoined defendants from issuing
the preferred stock based on the defendants' failure to obtain
shareholder consent.
In Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court,6 5 the New Jersey
District Court enjoined the issuance of a series of preferred shares
that would have afforded all shareholders except a 20% holder of
common stock or the preferred stock a disproportionately large
share of the voting power.6 6 The court held that under New Jersey
statutory law67 a board may not redistribute voting power within a
single class or series of stock. 8
titakeover amendments. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 5, at 14; Greene & Junewicz, supra
note 1, at 706; Blustein, Measures to Discourage Takeovers Stir Controversy at Annual
Meetings, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1983, at 29, col. 5. Shareholders of Rorer Group Inc. approved a non-binding proposal to rescind Rorer's poison pill, but the board nevertheless
rejected the proposal. Hertzberg, Rorer Group Is Seeking Unit of PantryPride, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 21, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (rights plan was discriminatory reclassification of common stock, illegal under New
Jersey law); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Delaware statute requires shareholder approval for substantial change in
structure of corporation); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 477-79
(D.N.J. 1985) (New Jersey statute does not give board power to enact proposed rights plan).
611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
6 See id. at 471, 477-79. In Asarco, the preferred shares, entitled Series C Preferred,
were to be issued as a dividend. Id. at 471. Each holder of common stock would receive a
one-tenth share of Series C Preferred stock. Id. In the event a person or group became
beneficial owner of more than 20% of Asarco's common stock or Series C Preferred stock,
each one-tenth share of Series C stock owned by anyone other than the 20% owner would
receive five votes in all matters submitted to common stockholders. Id. As a result, the 20%
owner would have only 4.1% of the vote. Id. Disproportionate voting rights would be extinguished by an any and all cash tender offer for a fair price. Id. at 472. Defensive devices
such as Asarco's that discriminate against the acquirer became popular after the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld a selective exchange offer by Unocal Corporation which excluded the
bidder, Mesa Petroleum Company. See Cohen, More Firms Using 'Lollipop' Tactics to
Fight Takeovers, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1985, at 3, col. 4.
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-2 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985).
"' Asarco, 611 F. Supp. at 477. The Asarco court determined that equality of voting
power among shareholders of the same class, or series of a class with more than one series, is
a basic concept of corporation law. See id. Although conceding that the board had a proper
business purpose, the court nevertheless concluded that the stock issuance was unlawful
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Despite the significant potential for abuse created by issuance
of the preferred stock, 9 the board's action withstood scrutiny by
the court under the primary purpose test because the board was
able to show that it sought to ensure that a takeover could be accomplished only under limited circumstances.7 0 The court gave little credence to the plaintiff's argument that shareholders would be
better off if bidders were able to make a variety of tender offers for
Asarco. 7 1 It is suggested that under the principles discussed previously, the court could properly have held that the board lacked the
authority to effect such a dramatic shift in the control of the corporation without shareholder approval.72
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, applying New Jersey law, leaned toward such a ruling in Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc.7 ' The court stated that "a board of director's assertion of a unilateral right, under the business judgment
rule, to act as a surrogate for the shareholder's independent right
of alienation of his stock is troublesome." 7 4 In AMF, the board
adopted a rights plan which, upon a change in control, would restrict AMF's ability to incur debt 5 and would give holders of a
nontransferable right the ability, upon exercise, to vote on a
merger as a class. 7 6 Without deciding whether the board acted with
a proper purpose,77 the court enjoined the board's action, holding
based on "the language of the statute, the potential for abuse of this power and the radical
departure from traditional corporate practice which it represents.
...
Id. at 478-79.
69Id. at 478. The Asarco court recognized that corporate control could easily be
manipulated through readjustment of intra-class voting rights by the issuance of blankcheck preferred stock. Id.
70 See id. at 474. The board's objective of limiting the circumstances under which takeovers could be accomplished necessarily entailed solidifying management control under the
preferred stock issuance. Id. at 470-71. Under the issuance, were Holmes A Court to acquire
80% of both common stock and Series C Preferred Stock, or substantially all shares other
than those held o controlled by Asarco, Holmes A Court would have held only 38.3% of the
vote. Id. at 471. In effect, management would have had veto power over almost any tender
offer. Id. As with the Household variety of poison pill plans, it is difficult to determine
whether management has become entrenched as a means of protecting the company from
harmful takeovers or as an end in itself. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
7 Asarco, 611 F. Supp. at 474.
72 See supra notes 49-58.
73 See 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (mem.).
"I Id. at 1260 n.6. According to the court, "the [r]ight of a shareholder to sell his stock
is a private transaction between a willing seller and a willing purchaser and in no way implicates the business judgment rule." Id.
71 See id. at 1256.
71 See id. at 1259.
77

Id.
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that the nontransferability feature violated New Jersey law in several respects.7 8 The court determined that a shareholder vote was
required to effectuate the change in structure and voting rights
that AMF's board sought to accomplish unilaterally.7 9 Consequently, this decision supports the corporate norm theory that
only the shareholders should have the authority to make a fundamental change in the corporate power structure in connection with
contests for control.8 0
Finally, in Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks,
Inc.,8 1 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted a preliminary injunction restraining the issuance of a preferred stock on the ground that the preferred rights plan was illegal under Delaware Law.8 2 In Unilever, under the threat of a takeover, the board of Richardson-Vicks approved the issuance of
preferred stock enabling the holder of a single share to cast
8 3
twenty-five votes on all matters before the common stockholders.
Upon the transfer of a preferred share, however, the transferee
could exercise only five of the twenty-five votes for a period of
thirty-six months.8 4
78

See id. at 1257-59.

79 See id. at 1259. The AMF court held that the nontransferability rights unlawfully
discriminated against shareholders who purchased shares of AMF after the record date of
the rights dividend. Id. at 1257-58. The court determined that under New Jersey law shareholder approval was necessary for this reclassification of common stock. Id. at 1258 & n.4
(citing Asarco v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985)). The court also
held that the alienability of the underlying common stock was unreasonably restrained because a shareholder could not transfer the right with common stock and thus the right
would lose most of its value upon the transfer of common stock. See AMF, 621 F. Supp. at
1258.
80 See 621 F. Supp. at 1259; supra notes 49-53. The AMF decision highlights the possibility that anomalies will result through the use of the primary purpose test to scrutinize
defensive tactics triggered by a change in control. Compare AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 1261
(triggering event raises inference board acted to entrench itself) with Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (directors must show defensive mechanism is
"reasonable in relation to threat posed" (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))) and Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468,
474 (D.N.J. 1985) (directors must show reasonableness of their action when defensive device
is designed to alter structure of the corporation). Inconsistencies in the application of the
primary purpose test in connection with defensive devices which are triggered by a change
in control illustrate the inherent shortcomings of the primary purpose test in this context.
See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
81 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
82 Id. at 409-10.
83 Id. at 408. In Unilever, the preferred stock was distributed as a dividend at the rate
of one new share of preferred for each five shares of common. Id.
8 Id. The Richardson family controlled over one-third of the stock in Richardson-
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The court declared that under Delaware law, board actions
that might fundamentally change the structure of a corporation
are not protected by the business judgment rule.85 Thus, without
considering the issue of the board's good faith,86 the court determined that the issuance was unlawfully discriminatory, 7 that it
impermissibly stripped shareholders of their ability to transfer voting power," and that it contravened the corporation's certificate of
incorporation. 9 The court concluded that shareholder approval
was required to change the structure of the corporation by reducing both the value of the shares and the transferability of voting
rights to the degree contemplated under the stock issuance.90
Thus, it is submitted that the Unilever court came close to approving a shareholder ratification requirement based on an internal
shift in control of Richardson-Vicks.
CONCLUSION

While the preferred issuances in Asarco, AMF and Unilever
resulted in somewhat technical violations of state law relating to
the transferability of shares and discrimination among shareholdVicks. Id. Thus, under the rights plan, if Unilever was able to acquire all non-Richardson
shares, the Richardson family would have absolute voting control for the next three years.

Id.
85 Id. at 409. The court in Unilever specifically cited, as a basic principle of Delaware

law, the rule that "action of the board which is calculated to alter the structure of the
corporation and results in a fundamental transfer of power from one corporate constituency
to another, is not shielded by the business judgment rule." Id. (citing Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), afl'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). It is submitted,
however, that this "basic principle" has again become an issue after the Delaware Supreme
Court's ruling in Household. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57
(Del. 1985).
88 Unilever, 618 F. Supp. at 409.
87 Id. at 409-10. The court in Unilever determined that the issuance would discriminate
among shareholders of the same issue of stock because voting rights consequently depend on
when shares were purchased. See id. at 409.
88Id. According to the Unilever court, after issuance a common shareholder would be
"unable to transfer two-thirds of his voting power." Id.
89 Id. at 409-10. The Unilever court remained unpersuaded by Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), in which the Delaware Supreme Court permitted a
board to make an exchange offer to all shareholders other than the purported greenmailer.
See id. at 956-59; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1258
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New Jersey courts would not follow Unocal decision). The court held Unocal inapplicable because the Richardson-Vicks preferred plan effectively discriminated
among holders of a series of shares by creating two classes within one series despite a provision in the certificate of incorporation requiring that "[a]ll shares of any one series of preferred stock shall be identical with each other in all respects." Unilever, 618 F. Supp. at 410.
90 Unilever, 618 F. Supp. at 410.
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ers, these cases support the notion that shareholders should have a
voting role in determining fundamental structural changes in the
corporation. It is suggested therefore, that shareholder approval
should be required when a corporation issues preferred shares to
shareholders as a defense either to a perceived or to an announced
tender offer, and thereby effects an internal transfer in control
from shareholders to the board. Shareholder approval of poison
pill rights plans would serve to legitimize the power that the board,
as negotiator, has to prevent almost any acquisition of the company and thereby return to the shareholders the authority to determine the fate of their corporation.
Virginia G. Goelz

